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“ [Government agencies are] invested with awesome powers
of compulsion - to tax, regulate , inspect, arrest - and attractive
powers of reward - to subsidize , purchase , and protec t.
Typically they exercise these powers as monopolists ,
immune from competition. To make them accountable , we
enshroud them in a maze of laws , regulations , and court
rulings; to keep them responsive , we expose them to access
by endless reporters , lawyers , committees, and investigators.
The result , inevitably , is a culture of risk aversion that
cannot readily be altered" James Q. Wilson (1994: 672).
INTRODUCTION
The panacea for the public sector's self-evidently inadequate
performance is seen by many as the need for civil servants to pursue a
results-oriented approach to their management using private sector
management principles and practices. This managerialist view now
pervades public administration in, most notably, Australia , New Zealand ,
the United Kingdom , Canada and the United States) (Caiden, 1994; Dixon,
1988 & 1995; Dixon & Kouzmin, 1994, Kouzmin , Dixon & Wilson, 1995.
Hede , 1991; Ingraham & Peters , 1988; Lane, 1985; Mascarenhas , 1993; Peters ,
1994; Pollitt , 1990) and , embrionicly , in Hong Kong (Hong Kong
Government, 1995). The purpose of this paper is to explore the meaning of
managerialism and its raison d' etre , and to identify the challenges and
threats that must be confronted before its promise of improved public agency
performance can become a reality.
扎1ANAGERIALISM:

THE PRIVATE SECTOR SOLUTION TO THE PUBLIC SECTOR PROBLEM
The neo-conservative ideology of neo-classical welfare economics
under-scores the linking of the public agency efficiency to managerial ability ,
authority and accountability by the the adoption of managerialist (b usinesslike) principles and practices (such as strategic planning and management,
customer service , quality assurance , performance management , risk
management and even accrual accounting) (Golembiewski & Kuhnert, 1994;
Hensher 1986), creating what Adams and Ingersoll (1990: 285) describe as
"the managerial metamyth".
Neo-classical welfare economics has acquired the classical Benthamite
distaste for the public sector (Bentham [1789] 1970) , which is constan t1 y
under suspicion of being inefficient, wasteful, and thus not giving value for
2

money , because the absence of any automatic disciplining mechanism
permits rent-seeking behaviour (Tullock & Eller , 1994) by bureaucrats , their
clients and the politicians who govern them , perhaps even with
Machiavallian f1 air (Gilman et a 1., 1993; Terrell , 1993). The neo-institutiona1
economist's concern is about "opportunism" in public administration (that
is , self-serving (rent-seeking) , even deceitfu1 and dishonest, behaviour by
bureaucrats , their clients and politicians) created either because
environmenta1 uncertainty makes contracts incomp1ete , or because
"principa1s" cannot effective1y monitor the behaviour of their "agents" , who
do not have identica1 interests and who have information that is not
accessib1e to to them. Under the influence of this ideo10gy, public agencies
are conceptualised as amorphous , instrumenta1 , rationa1-1ega1 form of
hierarchica1 organisations administered by rationally self-interested officia1s,
who , according to Tullock (1965: 29-30) can be normally treated ". . . as if
[they] were behaving out of selfish motivation". These officia1s, akin to the
archetypa1 traditiona1 bureaucrats (Gregory, 1991: 307-8) , are inherent uti1ity
maximisers motivated by the desire to maximise their own utility functions
that are c1ear1y self-serving (by embracing power , income , perks , public
reputation, prestige , patronage , ease of making change, ease of management,
convenience and security) , although not exc1usive1y so (by allowing for
organisationa1 10yalty, mission commitment, professiona1 pride and serving
the public interest, and agency output) (Downs , 1967: Niskanen 1973). The
result is the inherent tendencies for such bureaucrats to be deceitfu1, or even
dishonest , by distorting information communicated upward , so as to
promote their own self-interest; by making decisions that are consistent with
their own self-interest; and by imp1ementing policy decisions in such a way
as to promote their own self-interest (Downs , 1967: 77-78) , which u1timate1y
means maximising the size of their agencies (Tullock, 1976: 26-35) in terms
of personne1 (Noll & Fiorina , 1979), budgets (Niskanen 1973: 22-23; a1so 1994;
but see Conybeare , 1984) or discretionary budgets (defined as the difference
between the budget received and the minimum cost of producing the
required outputs) (Niskanen, 1975).
perpetua1
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This creates a bureaucracy that is

1975). Bureaucratic failure is thus inevitable; the bureaucratic solution to
which, according to Perlman (1976: 76) , is usually:
. . . to create another bureau to oversee those who have lapsed into
sin. Bureaux are piled on bureau and the bureacracy grows on.
This process of ever expanding vertical and structural control is a response
to the need for a governance mechanism that minimises the cost of any
mismatch between controls and tasks by making bureaucracies responsible
for the tasks they perform. A situation is thus created where monitoring
bureaux become increasingly involved with the minutiae of administration
and thus have a growing demand for control-oriented information, hence
Downs' observation that (1967: 150):
The quantity and detail of reporting required by monitoring
bureaus tends to rise steadily over time , regardless of the amount
or nature of the activity being monitored.
In the face of bureaucratic failure , Weimer and Vining (199 1: 132) observe

that the "principals" (the politicians who govern) face :
. . the task of creating organisational arrangements [incentives,
sanctions and monitoring] that minimise the sum of the costs of
the undesirable behaviour of agents and of the activity
undertaken to control it
Managerialism
Uhr (1990: 22) defines managerialism as:
The pursuit of results-oriented systems of government
management through streamlined processes of decision-making
designed to allow greater autonomy but also greater responsibility
for the field or program manager.
Managerialism:

•

places emphasis on policy management and implementation
rather than on policy development and design in public
administration;
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•

stresses efficiency , effectiveness and quality , as against
process and equity, in the management of public resources
(involving goal setting , performance benchmaking ,
performance definition , performance measurement ,
performance feedback and performance enhancement
incentives);

•

advocates the use private sector management practices in the
public sector;

•

seeks to diffuse responsibility and to devolve authority, with
the establishment of corresponding management
responsibility and public accountability structures;

-.
•

shifts the public accountability focus from inputs and process
to outputs and outcomes; and
prefers to create, where ever possible , a competitive public
administration (Halachmi & Holzer , 1993) , especially for
those public agencies responsible for delivering government
services (see also Rehfuss , 1991).

MANAGERIALISM AS "GOOD PUBLIC ADMINISTRA TION"
Managerialism fosters the proposition that "good government and
good organisation results from deliberate intentions , detailed plans and
consistent decisions" (Prasser 1990: 194). The politico-adminis 廿 ative task of
government is conceptualised by managerialists as responding as efficient1 y
and as effectively as possible to the claims made by its various
constituencies , using a rational-comprehensive model of policy-making,
involving de-politicised , goal-oriented strategies , chosen after
comprehensive instrumental-rational (means-ends mode) analysis , and
routinely implemented by compliant, decentralised yet hierarchicallycontrolled and accountable public agencies. Such public agencies are viewed
systemically as problem-solving and program-delivery mechanisms ,
conceptualised as production units (open systems) within which measurable
"inputs" are used in a "production process" (generating "activities 勻 to
produce measurable "outputs" that have an "impact" (produce "costs" and
市 enefits") and thus generate measurable objective-related "outcomes" that
measure given and known "organisational objectives" that are compatible
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with given and known "government policy objectives" (Breton, 1974). The
management of the public "production process" is thus best de-coupled , as
far as possible , from political structures and processes and best left not to selfseeking and empire-building bureaucrats (Kaufman, 1981) , but to cognitive,
goal-oriented , problem-solving , decision-making and interventionist
technocrats (Flam , 1990: 225):
•

who would always prefer to use information as an aid to
joint problem solving , rather than distorting it to promote
their own narrow self-interest, such as Kobrak's (1992)
“ organisational gangsterism" (b ehaviour by individuals that
accelerates their personal career growth while
simultaneously undermining organisational goals) , or use it
as a resource in an intra- or inter-organisational strqggle (as
described by 叭Tilensky (1967);

•

who would use advanced analytical techniques, to determine
which programs wiU (and do) best achieve their desired
objectives , rather than judging merely on the basis of selfinterest; and

•

who would adopt private sector business practices to create
the appropriate structures , processes , culture and incentives
to deliver those programs most efficiently and more
economically, operating within a outcome-centred budgetary
and public accountability systems , rather than adopting
administrative practices aimed at maximising their span of
control, their overall subordinate personnel or their budgets.

In this setting , publicly-provided services would be delivered with more
"productive efficiency" (by increasing productivity) and with more
"exchange efficiency" (by maximising the utility derived from those services
by supplying 0叫 y citizens who derive the highest utility from them (that is ,
have the greatest need for them) , which is achieved by altering consumer
behaviour through education, regulation and economic incentives) . This
would make government programs and , indeed , government, both more
cost-efficient" and "cost-effective" in the use of resources , w hich would
11

maximise community satisfaction (Simon, 1957: 186) , maximise public
confidence in government (Wholey , 1993) , and maximise the quantum of

resources available to the private sector (Fellow & Kelaher , 1991; Horton,
1987).
MANAGERIALISM AS IIGOOD PUBLIC MANAGEMENT"
The managerialist belief is that there is a body of sound management
practices applicable to the private sector that is generic in its scope and thus
can be directly transferable to the public sector , subject to some cultural
limits. This belief, espoused by no less a personage than Peter F. Drucker
(Gazell , 1994), is illusory , because of political control , or at least influence ,
over resources and management processes.
Managing is the art of doing and public and private sector managers
practice their arts differently (Lynne, 1984; Mathiasen, 1984; Pritchard, 1992:
131) largely because of their different external environments, especially their
different regulatory and accountability regimes (Rainey, 1989). As Parker
and Subramaniam have observed (1975: 39):
Examining private and public organisations internally , we may be
impressed as the management theorist were , by their structural
resemblances: hierarchies of values and goals; horizontal division
of labour; “ vertical specialisation" into hierarchies of authority;
indoctrination of staff with organisational goals and rules; systems
of coordination and communication; and so on. Looking from

inside a private organisation outwards , . . . we may be struck by its
own autonomy , subject to purely monetary balancing of input and
output , and by its contrast with the confusing mass of
governmental organisations , their apparent lack of costconsciousness' and their power to interfere with private
organisations. Looking from inside a government organisation . .
. we may be aware of its orderly ties with other organisations and
with its wide horizons , in contrast with the market-oriented
competition and self centredness of private organisations.
I

Organisations in the public and private sectors plan differently, because their
decision-making, budgeting and accountab i1 ity processes differ. They budget
differently, because their budgeting processes and accountability regimes
differ. They organise functions differently , because of their budgeting
processes , regulatory and accountability regimes differ. They manage
staffing differently, because of their regulatory and accountab i1 ity regimes as
7

well as their organisational cultures differ. They do , of course have
similarities in terms of the tasks they perform (Brianas , 1993; Duncan et al.,
1991). The issue of fundamental importance , however , is the extent to
which private and public management tasks coincide. Al lison (1982: 29) has
concluded:
. . public and private managers are at least as different as they are
similar , and that the differences are more important than the
similarities.
The inculcation of managerialist values in public agencies has put
pressure on civil servants to adopt business management practices
(Longbottom , 1987), on the grounds that :
•

management problems related to service delivery by public
agencies are com plex technical ma tters of rela ting to
productive efficiency, productivity and costs , which are best
resolved by highly technical experts;

•

centrall y-imposed regulations and externall y-imposed
political and policy constraints unreasonably restrain expert
management decision-making;

•

technical abilities and management capacities are the proper
basis for establishing and maintaining the right to manage
public service delivery processes , which is a move towards
the de-politicisation of complex organisational and
environmental issues tha t would otherwise be resol ved
within public and political forums; and

•

poli tics and policy , therefore , are proper1y red uced to
constraining , rather than enabling , forces within public

.

service delivery agencies; thus , ípso facto
the adoption of private sector management practices are the
solution to " poor management" of public agencies;

This managerialist perspective has , however , a missing link. Private-sector
decision-making, with its self-correcting dynamic feedback loops (automatic
disciplining mechanism) , is difficult to replicate in the public sector. First,
authority in the public sector is much more dispersed , reflecting pressures
from pluralistic stakeholder constituencies , especially in a representative
8

democracy. Secondly , political decision-makers do not always share
common goals , objectives and values. Finally, they may have neither the
required expertise nor the willingness (or ability) to learn from the outcomes
of past decisions. lndeed , policies and political process are the product of, in
the words of March and Olsen (1983: 292) , "incremental adaption to
changing problems with available solutions within gradually evolving
structures of meaning." Thus , as Prasser (1990: 194) remarks "intentions are
changed , plans become irrelevant, and consistency becomes an impediment
to the day to day management of issues , crises and problems".
MANAGERIALIS孔1

AND PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM

Managerialists seek to shift public agencies from an allegiance to the
bureaucratic (hierarchy and control) paradigm to an acceptance of a postbureaucratic (innovation and support) paradigm (Barzelay , 1992, especially
ch. 8; Odom et a l., 1990).
Where this has been attempted most
comprehensively (notably in Australia and New Zealand) it has involved
initiating what Emery and Trist (1965) have described as a "turbulent
transition" aimed at making public agencies rational instruments for
achieving shared goals (Gouldner, 1959: 404; Simon, 1976: 257) , perhaps with
a commercial or quasi-commercial twis t. Managerialist pressures thus create
a need for a unique set of organisational changes within public agencies
agencies that would bring them into a more congruent "strategic fit". This
means aligning their strategies , culture and leadership style to their
environment (Chorn, 1991). This requires them to:
•

become more performance oriented, whilst maintaining its
organisational integrity and protecting its extant professional
and technical standards; and

•

"manage by antici pa tion" (Chartier , 1985: 177) the
organisational and behavioural changes needed to achieve
the desired level of performance .

To achieve the desired changes a public agency needs to embark on a multifacited organisational development process involving:

•

the articulation of an organisational change goal statement
embracing increased organisational effectiveness at the

micro-1eve1 (such as, better qua1ity services, greater va1ue for
money and 10wer costs) and enhanced organisationa1 choice;
•

the specification of the like1y impact (b oth directiona1 and
degree) of the changes on the organisation;

•

the deve10pment of an imp1ementation p1an for the
proposed organisationa1 change , one that is based on a
wide1y-shared diagnosis of the like1y reactions of those
responsib1e for imp1ementing the changes , or of those
affected by the changes (inc1uding those 10cated in the
Downsian "hinterland", "interior fringe" ， μno man' s 1and"
and "periphery" (Downs , 1967);

.
•

the imp1ementation of organisationa1 change strategies and
tactics , invo1ving an entire organisation or a coherent part
thereof; and
the monitoring of the impact and the success of the
imp1emented organisationa1 change strategies and tactics , so
as to determine w hether and w hen adjustments to them are
needed.

The desired organisational changes are achieved by the use of
judiciously chosen intervention strategies designed to change the public
agency's structure, cu1ture and procedures (Blake & Mouton, 1976; Bowers et
a1., 1975; Dyer , 1981; Rotter & Schlesinger, 1979).
Structural Change
The adoption of a performance orientation by a public agency demands
a review and perhaps a re-casting of its structure - its "managementprescribed ro1es" (Kahn, 1974: 496) - to ensure that it is aligned with its
performance goa1s , so ensuring that the requiredμstrategies of contro1"
(Chi1d , 1972) areb in p1ace to facilitate the efficient and effective conduct of its
activities. This does not imp1y that hierarchy is the appropriate design
prescription (Rothschild-Whitt, 1979) in the context of either organisationa1
comp1exity (Kouzmin, 1980) or efficiency improvement (Marglin, 1971).
Such restructuring shou1d not be symbolic (Ede1man, 1964), nor shou1d it be
part of the Downsian 'rigidity cycle' , and thus a response to perceived 10ss of
senior management authority (Downs , 1967: 165-6), nor shou1d it be a means
啥EEA
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of enhancing control by senior management (Simon et a l., 1950). Rather ,
restructuring needs to be seen as a means of de-stabilising protected elites
and threatening institutional values that are inimical to performanceoriented success (Selznick, 1957). This may well create a need to have an
organisational structure which is:

.

.
•

vertically flatter , so that problem-solving decisions , especially
in relation to service de1ivery, can be made at points that are
closer to the clients (stakeholders) , so as to reduce
performance-sensitive decision response times , to simplify
co-ordination and to reduce communication distortions; and
less forma 1ised , to give staff more discretion in satisfying
idiosyncratic c1ient (stakeholder) needs; and
horizontally more complex , even one with a significant
degree of spatial differentiation, as service providers find an
advantage in being geographically closer to their clients
(s takeholders).

The inherent problem is that these differentiated structures may become
segmented into tightly closed sub-systems serving self-serving vested
interests (J ones , 1991). Shareef (1994: 490) argues that sub-system
congruence , including value congruence , within an organisation is an
essential ingredient of successful organisational transformation (but see also
McSwain & White , 1993; Romanelli & Tushman, 1994).
Cul tural Change
Organisational culture , at an operational level , comprises three interrelated dimensions (Marcoulides & Heck, 1993):

•

a socio-cultural system of the perceived functioning of an
organisation's strategies and practices;

•

an organisational value system; and

•

the collective beliefs of individuals working within the
organisatíon.

A public agency's traditional ideals , norms and values must change if it is to
inculcate a performance-oriented organisational culture tha t:
11

•

supports managerialist values and attitudes , but not so as to
select out diversity (Sinclair , 1989; Horwitz , 1990) by
permitting different opinions;

•

encourages and supports behaviours that are performance centred;

•

emphasises quality service , adaptability , creativity, initiative ,
cohesion and team work;

•

gives employees leeway to make mistakes , but requires that
they learn from them;

•

recognises the di versi ty of commi tments and affilia tions tha t
civil servants have (Philips et a1., 1994), including those:
•

to their clients (stakeholders);

.

to their sense of what constitutes:

•

•

the "public interest" (Barth, 1992); and

•

appropriate professional standards; and

to their employer' s poli tical , burea ucra tic ,
organisational, managerial and financial imperatives
(Sinclair, 1989 & 1991); and

•

acknowledges that individual behaviours wiU differ
according and individual beliefs about public service , risk
preferences , preferred time horizons , attitudes to change
(whether perceived as an opportunity or as a threat) , and
tolerances of ambiguity and indeterminacy.

This new culture will have its own symbols , rituals and myths, which gives
rise to a potential culture conflict in terms of Schein' s (1985) culture
dimensions of:
•

basic assumptions (those learnt responses that are
unconsciously held and that determine group perceptions
and feelings and may even generate less than satisfactory
"crisis agreements" (Taras , 1991));
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•

values and beliefs (the essential constituents of an
individual's conceptual apparatus); and

•

visible artefacts (such as dress codes and office layout
(Domahidy & Gilsinan, 1992)).

The existence of a culture conflict reflects the existence of resistance to
change by those who , when their past is threatened , are frightened of loosing
whatever it was they valued in the old culture , perhaps even their own
sense of self-esteem. Culture conflict must be managed (Brown, 1992) by
those who are sensitive to the symbolic dimensions of their management
roles (Gunner , 1990) and who are capable of promoting , protecting and
propagating the new culture-forming values (Sutton & Nelson , 1990).
Culture conflict must be broken down by reason rather than by coercion
(Karp , 1988), which requires that the resistance be:
•

brought to the surface (Lundberg, 1990b);
honoured by being acknow ledged;

•

explored and probed , to distinguish the authentic resistance
(directed towards specific demands) from the pseudoresistance (a product of feelings (such as resentment of
authority and old grudges) rather than specific demands);
and

•

negotiated until it reaches a level that is no longer
d ysfunctiona l.

Soberingly , Anthony (1990) has observed that management-imposed
organisational belief systems , values and meanings have rarely been
transmitted, successfully , to those whose behaviour are targeted for change ,
which has the effect of organisationally isolating managers , who become
locked into a commitment to values that are not shared and who become
cocooned within the safety of their contrived organisational world view.
How to achieve the required culture change is thus the challenge. One
approach is to adopt a cultural revolution" strategy (Gangliardi , 1986) ,
which is designed to develop an organisational socialisation (l earning)
process (Ostroff & Kozlowski, 1992) that would induct all its employees into
the desired managerialist culture , with the intent of making it dominan t. In
11
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implementing this cultural revolution, a public agency has to ensure that its
goals are clearly articulated, so that staff focus is centred on those positive
dimensions of reform that are compatible with the existing culture (such as
improving services and creating new career opportunities) rather than the
negative dimensions (such as cost cutting and the spectre of staff
redundancies) , so as to avoid a debilitating and thus dysfunctional culture
conflicts (Gregory , 1983), and even a more destructive sub-culture warfare
(between the new and the old cultures) or perhaps sub-culture elitism
(associated with the creation of elite groups whose values are perceived to be
more important that those of the agency as a whole).
Procedural Dimensions
Public agencies confront the dilemma of how to develop and
implement practices and procedures that will make them more businesslike , the essence of which is stakeholder-driven strategic planning ,
implementation and control , which are intended to achieving different
planning , implementation and control outcomes. These then define a set of
new tasks to be performed , which, in turn, generates a set of training and
development needs for those w ho are expected to perform those new tasks.
The process involved focuses on building the relevant knowledge and skills
and on developing commitment to reform in those who have to change
their behaviours.
MANAGERIALIS 孔1

AND PUBLIC MANAGERS

Public managers confronting managerialist reforms are required to
manage not only the radical structural , procedural and cultural changes
involved , but also their resultant anxiety-generating personal change
implications (Ri chardson, 1987). In the process they confront the prospect
that if change and uncertainty are not dealt with appropriately they might
produce the levels of staff distrust that Culbert and 弘1cDonough (1986)
consider would becomes an obstacle to the internalisation of new goals ,
values and assumptions. Perhaps more importantly , they may generate to
the type of fear that Benveniste (1977) considers would engender counterproductive pathological responses from staff, notably, paranoia , a siege
mentality , turf protection, back stabbing , dishonesty , sabotage and even
"organizational gangsterism" (Kobrak , 1992), all of which may give rise to
some of Caiden's (1991) all-too-numerous identifiable "bureaupathologies"
(those "vices , maladies and sicknesses of bureaucracy") and may introduce
14

irrationalities , rather than the hoped-for rationalities , into administrative
processes. If left uncorrected these pathological responses may become
institutionalised and begin to inhibit the organisation' s capacity and
willingness to learn from its environment, giving rise to serious public
and/or political complaints about incompetence (Ott & Shafritz, 1994) and so
threaten the capacity of the organisation to adapt or even to survive , by
adversely impacting on vertical management credibility, change motivation
and functional unit co-operation (Gabris &孔1itchell ， 1991). Perceptions of
public managers' adroitness becomes related to the adequacy of their agency' s
perceptions about the need for change (and the nature of required change
processes); and to their capacity to sift out and process reliable information,
to plan , deliver and evaluate change , and to manage the conflicting
demands generated by change.
The inculcation of managerialist values and practices is achieved by
rewarding public managers who are more adaptive in the face of transitional
opportunities (Bechkard & Harris , 1977; Kimberly & Quinn, 1984; Nadler,
1982), by giving them more resources , from both budgetal and extra-budgetal
sources , and more authority , through greater decision-making autonomy
(Meier , 1980 & 1987). This , in turn, encourages them, and their staff, to
concentrate on affective , cognitive , and even motor learning, the outcome
of which is change (Kn owles, 1973: 6-11); the acceptance and adoption of new
insights , outlooks , expectations , thought processes (Smith , 1983: “) and
behaviours (and habits) (Bunning, 1992; Crow & Crow, 1963) which, in turn,
legitimate and facilitate change by devaluing commitment to past practices
and to conformity. In this environment, managers need to be able to:

•

process and evaluate strategic information under conditions
of uncertainty;

•

design and put in place new structures that address the
structurally contingent problems of change by facilitating and
directing information flows into patterns of cognition,
communication and analysis (Scharpf, 1977) and that kindle
those internal thought processes in others that lead to
attitudinal and/or behavioural change , so as to reduce
commitment to past practices and to facilitate innovation
(Grady, 1992); and
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•

become more adaptive to the transitional opportunities and
constraints , whether by strategic choice or a reactive response
to changes in the environment, or both (Astley & Van de
Ven, 1983; Hrebiniak & Joyce , 1985).

It is , thus , an environment that encourages and rewards managers who are

transformational leaders , defined by Burns (1978:

20) 的 leaders

w ho engage

. . . with others in such a way that leaders and followers raise one
another to higher levels of motivation and morality. . . . Their
purpose which might have started out as separate but related so
becomes fused . . . as mutual support for common purpose.
They can be characterised as leaders capable of "idealised influence" ,
"inspirational motivation" , "intellectual stimulation" and 代individ ualised
consideration" (Bass & Avolio , 1994). Managers are encouraged in this
environment to give charismatic leadership (Conger , 1989; Conger &
Kanungo , 1987, 1988, 1992 & 1994). This is a style of leadership that causes
others to see and pursue a different direction than they would otherwise
pursue , thus converting them to followers , by creating common purpose ,
through visionary direction-setting; by building new organisational
relationships; by being able to manage ambiguity; and by becoming cultural
architects , so producing organisational change through the unfreezing of the
existing culture and its realigning to the new vision, and so begin the
necessary dynamic process of shifting its shared assumptions , values and
norms (as described by Goldberg , 1985)). In such an environment
operational leadership (Fiedler & Chemers, 1974) that is planning oriented
and designed to produce orderly results is relegated to the realm of middle
management (also Barker, 1989).
On Achieving Individual Behaviour Change
There are a myriad of motivational forces that drive individuals
towards the practice of the new behaviours:
need: hierarchy of needs theory , as argued by Maslow (1970);
motivation-hygiene theory, as argued by Herzberg, Mausner
and Snyderman (1959) and Herzberg (1966); achievementpower-affiliation theory, as argued by McClelland (1961); and
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existence-relatedness-growth theory , as argued by Alderfer
(1972);
•

goal setting: specificity of goals theory , as argued by Locke
(1968) and by Locke and Latham (1990));

•

expected attractiveness of outcome: expectancy theory as
argued by Vroom (1964) ; and

•

social comparisons: equity theory , as argued by Adams
(1965)).

Which (if any) of these motivational forces are effective can depend on the
individuals':
•

attitudes and values, notably their capacity and willingness to
build the motivation they need to adopt new behaviours;
and

•

personal characteristics , notably their capacity and
willingness to be critically observant of their own behaviours
and motivators and so develop the capacity to manage their
own behaviour change.

To change behaviour requires a variety of organisational strategies,
premised on the proposition that individuals in the process of adopting a
new behaviour experiences learning (Atkinson et a1., 1988) that can be the
result of:
•

observations made of the new behaviour as practiced by
another person, and its subsequent imitation by the learner
(sociallearning theory, as argued by Bandura (1986)); or

•

feedback received by the learner about the success or failure
attendant upon the new behavioural being practiced
(positive and negative reinforcements theory , as argued by
Skinner (1969).

The practice of learnt desirable new behaviour in the workplace can thus be
encouraged by means of:
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•

role modelling , involving the use of "model" staff practicing
the desirable behaviours for other rnanagers to observe ,
recall, rehearse and irnitate (Manz & Sirns , 1981); and/or

•

instrumental conditioning , involving the consistent
application of contingencies of reinforcernent (Frederiksen ,
1982; Kerr , 1975; Kornaki et al., 1989; Luthans & Kreitner ,
1982; Miller, 1978):
•

"positive reinforcernent" (providing a rewarding or
sa tisfying consequence following the perforrnance of the
desired behaviour , which further encourages that
behaviour);

•

"negative reinforcernent" (stopping a dissatisfying
consequence following the perforrnance of a desired
behaviour, which further encourages that behaviour);、

“ extinction" (stopping a satisfying consequence frorn
following the perforrnance of an undesired behaviour ,
which discourages that behaviour); and/or
•

"punishment" (by providing an unsa tisfying
consequence following the performance of the
undesired behaviour , which further discourages that
behaviour)

How , and even whether , the continued practice of undesirable
behaviour should be "punished" is open to sorne question (Arvey &
Ivancevich, 1980; Arvey & Jones , 1985; Beyer & Trice , 1984; Katz & Kahn,
1978; Lussier , 1990; Miner & Brewer, 1976; O'Reilly &叭Teitz， 1980; Podsakoff,
1982), for while the undesired behaviour rnay be temporarily suppress or ar
least weakened by "punishment" , it could well have undesirable secondary
effects. The recalcitrant staff, rnay in the face of "punishment" , resort to
counter-productive defensive behaviours (like the denial of personal
shortcornings or the blarning of others) or aggressive behaviours (like hate ,
hostility and deviousness). They rnost likely become de-rnotivated, perhaps
because of their confusion over their slighted dignity, caused when their job
cornmitment is questioned , or because of their anger and frustration , caused
when they cannot dealt with that confusion Their sub-conscious hope is
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that change will not be necessary for them, which is when they begin to
b1ame others for their plight. Disillusionment follows , which is when they
communicate their unhappiness with others.
Then comes uncooperativeness , which is when they begin criticising their organisation.
U1timate1y , they become non-functiona1 members of the organisation,
which is when they become alienated and cynica1 in their behaviour. They
may become focussed on what Homer and Levine (1985: 241) describe as
"triviocracy" name1y:
. continua1 intense combat over issues which seem to outside
observer to be unimportant to both the organiza tion and its
members while the major prob1ems and opportunities
confronting the organisation go unattended.
Such a preoccupation, they (1985: 249) argue:
. . produces alienation from colleaguesand work, and produces a
host of collective bads from 10w mora1e to 10w productivity. The
individua1 is a1ways on the defensive: forced to fight for one's
dignity, ever fearfu1 with no permanent gains made.
A person's behaviour change can be predicted from their attitude
towards that change (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). Vroon's expectancy theory
(Vroon, 1964) indicates that an individua1 compares possib1e future
outcomes of various behavioura1 alternatives and then chooses the
behaviour that is most attractive in terms of outcomes (孔1itchell， 1974).
Individua1s who believes that a particu1ar behaviour (or task) will 1ead
mostly to positive outcomes for them will ho1d a favourab1e attitude
towards that behaviour. On the other hand , if they cannot anticipate that
that behaviour will 1ead to positive outcomes for them , or even worse , if
they anticipate that it will 1ead to negative outcomes , such as incongruence
with established individua1 or group norms , job insecurity, 10ss of selfesteem , se1f-confidence , reward , contro1 , power , competence or
re1ationships , then their attitudes to it will be negative and resistance to
change may emerge (Beer , 1980; Calish & Gamache , 1981; Connor &
Patterson, 1982; Hu1tman, 1979; Karp , 1984; Mann & Neff, 1961; Zander, 1961;
but see a1so Nord & Jermier, 1994). Thus imposing behaviours (ways of
doing tasks) on individua1s by edict will not, ípso facto , generate a positive
attitude towards them, which means that they may perform the new tasks in
a perfunctory way until the externa1 constraints are removed, which then
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allows them to revert to old behaviours that are consistent with their
attitudes. The implication of this is that achieving lasting behaviour change
requires that those whose behaviours are expected to change must be able to:
•

perceive the internal or external pressure on the
organisation to adopt the required changes in the mediumto-long-term (Greiner , 1969);

•

perceive support for those changes from those at the highest
echelons of the organisation (Blake & Mouton, 1964; Dalton
et a1., 1970), who have demonstrated a willingness to commit
the necessary resources to achieve change;

•

perceive a congruence between the new behaviours and the
organisation's shared values , beliefs and norms that
determine what is expected and what is rewarded in the
organisation (孔1argulies & Raia , 1978);

•

be involved in the organisa tional change process (Beer &
Davis , 1976; Coch & French, 1948; but see also Shareef, 1994:
511);

•

see that other members of their organisational unit ,
constituting a critical mass or dominant coalition, are
adopting the new behaviours (Beer , 1980; Beckhard & Harris,
1977; Goodman el a 1., 1980; Margulies & Raia , 1978) , so
evidencing that the new behaviours have become congruent
with group beliefs and values (Feldman, 1983; Feldman &
Arnold, 1984; Ki esler & Kiesler , 1971);

•

share the beHef with other group members that positive or
negative sanctions will follow performance or nonperformance of the new behaviours (Katz & Kahn, 1978) ,
including sanctions derived from the level of cohesiveness ,
the existence of formal authority structures and the reward
systems within the group (Beer, 1980);

•

receive continued feedback and information regarding the
behaviour changes (Beckhard & Harris, 1977); and
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•

perceive that both the formal policies and systems and the
organisational culture are consistent with, and supportive of,
the changes and innovation (Huse , 1975; Shih, 1993a &
1993b; Zimbardo et a1., 1990).

On Managing Organisational Change
An effective organisational change process requires leadership that not
only has the desire to initiate change but also the authority to do so (Lloyd ,
1993). It also requires leaders who behave as Bellavista's (1989-90) "heros"
(who , being dissatisfied .with the status quo and being willing to challenge
it, plan and execute change, after winning allies and vanquishing enemies)
and who have the ability to to create Gilbert and Kleiner's (1993) "change
lovers" , other individuals who have a commitment to change , who are
willing to take control of the change process , who accept change as a
challenge , and who are able to connect the diverse elements of the change
process. This style of leadership is crucially important in the organisational
change process as a means of coping with the almost inevitable barriers to
change , namel y the lack of belief by some in the appropriateness of change
and the resistance by others to that change , perhaps in fear of their own
possible failure.
The successful implementation of managerialist reform thus requires
leadership that is capable of:
re-defining organisational primary purpose and core beliefs
(Covey & Gulledge, 1992);
•

creating a vision (Buhler , 1993) of how the post-reform
future will look in terms of organisational structure, culture
and performance standard;

•

defining the required strategic objectives within a mediumto-long-term perspective;

•

planning and resourcing adequately the necessary structural
and procedural changes; and

•

empowering those expected to assume group leadership
posìtions.
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CONCLUSION
Managerialist reform may improve the performance of public agencies ,
but 0叫 Y if a wide variety of challenges and threa ts confronting public
agencies can be addressed
•

at the the service delivery unit level , these include how to
inculcate a performance-oriented culture and to encourage
the wide-spread adoption of business practices and
management techniques;

•

at the agency level , these include how to address the issues
surrounding the change of organisational culture (including
culture differen tia tion and even conflict) , s tructure ,
procedures and accountability;

•

at the central agency level, these include how to address the
issues associated with resource and policy coordination,
control and accountability; and

•

at the the politico-administrative system level these include
how to address the issues of political, organisational and
management accountability, ethics and values).

In essence , managerialists expect public managers to improve
organisational efficiency, so as to reduce costs , while at the same time
enhance organisational performance by meeting the often competing needs
of a variety of stakeholders , within politico-administrative environment
that punishes mistakes and rewards risk averse behaviour, regardless of the
costs and effort involved in avoiding unacceptable or intolerable outcome
flowing from administrative decisions. The real challenge is thus to change
this culture of risk aversion at all levels , so as to permit organisational and
management innovation to take place.
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